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The Social Cost of Road Congestion in Ile-de-France Region (and France): 
Empirical Evidences from the Paris Ring-Road1 
 
Martin Koning2 
Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne (University of Paris 1) 
March 2010 
Abstract: 
 
The aim of this article was to assess specific problems concerning traffic congestion access to 
the city of Paris. First, we attempted to evaluate the evolution of the congestion cost for the 
Paris Ring-Road (PRR), the major urban highway surrounding the French capital, during the 
period from 2000-2007. A speed-density methodology was implemented which enabled us to 
differentiate the external costs of road congestion between speed-classes of 5 km/h. These 
results were useful to subsequently propose the order of magnitude of time losses at national 
and regional scales, as well as marginal pricing schemes which could potentially be used in 
order to correct road congestion externality on the PRR.  
 
Our empirical investigation concluded that, in 2007, the PRR was more costly for central Paris 
area (130 M€) compared to that of seven years earlier (117 M€). The deterioration of traffic 
conditions, symbolized by the mean speed fall (- 5.2 %), dominates the infrastructure least 
used (- 2.2 %). Based on these figures, the social cost of road congestion is thought to reach 
about 0.2 % of the French GDP. This ratio becomes three times higher once reported on a 
regional scale and underlines that road congestion is an important issue for Ile-de-France. 
Finally, despite their analytical limitations, the proposed taxes clearly illustrate the challenges 
related to road-pricing strategies.  
 
Keywords: Paris Ring-Road, Road Congestion, Speed-Density Relationship, Road-Pricing 
JEL Classification: R40, R41, R62        
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1. Introduction  
 
Economists frequently present road congestion as a “non-market interaction” particularly 
relevant to understand urban dynamics. If the concentration of people and economic activities 
within a limited area results in efficiency gains (Duranton and Puga 2003), road congestion is 
in fact one of the major “push-forces” characterizing urban agglomerations (Thisse and 
Lafourcade 2006). By increasing the cost of moving people (Glaeser and Kahn 2004), this 
impacts the spatial structure of cities and influences their productive advantages (Anas and 
alii. 1998). More recently, congestion issues have subsequently become critical because of 
global warming and concerns linked to sustainable development: pollutant emissions indeed 
increase as traffic speed decreases. Consequently, the fight against greenhouse gaz primarily 
deals with the excessive use of private cars in urban areas where road congestion has to be 
relieved (OCDE 2005, European Commission 2007). 
 
Nevertheless, and in spite major interest3, economic scientific research has to date been 
unable to homogenously assess this socio-spatial phenomenon. Therefore, important 
differences occur in the way road congestion is measured (Lindsey and Verhoef 2000, Parry 
and alii. 2006, De Palma and Zaouali 2007). Time losses related to the over-use of 
transportation infrastructures have been reported to range between 2 % and 0.1 % in the GDP 
of developed countries (De Palma and Zaouali 2007). The extent of market failures generally 
conditions the force of public intervention. Consequently, these academic divergences may 
seem puzzling. In the French case, challenges related to road congestion could impact 
respectively either 36 billions euros or 180 millions euros. By focusing on one specific 
transportation infrastructure, this research attempts to produce empirical information allowing 
us to propose a credible order of magnitude for road congestion costs.  
 
The main object of our study was the Paris Ring-Road (PRR). This urban highway 
surrounding the French capital is a strategic interface for the socio-economical life of the 
Parisian agglomeration, one of the wealthiest geographical areas worldwide (Davezies 2008, 
Gilli and Offner 2009). The infrastructure is known for being one of the most frequented 
roads in Europe. Therefore, the cost of its congestion is of major interest for at least three 
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 One other major concern linked to road congestion relates to “oil dependency” (Parry and alii. 2006), 
even if this dimension strongly depends on the national provision sources. 
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reasons. First, because our calculations were conducted for the years 2000 and 2007, the 
evolution of PRR’s congestion should be considered accurate. Motorized traffic conditions in 
Paris city have recently experienced a particular evolution (Prud’homme and Kopp 2008) and 
watching what happens to the PRR could logically be relevant. Second, figures on this 
transportation infrastructure could be used as a useful benchmark concerning the magnitude 
of the social waste due to road congestion. Finally, if urban road-pricing is implemented in the 
Ile-de-France Region (Lindsey and De Palma 2006, Bureau and Glachant 2008), the PRR 
would certainly become a perfect candidate. This factor, of course, must take into 
consideration the various challenges at stake.  
 
In order to assess these different questions, we organized our research as follows. Section 2 
presents and discusses the methodological framework used in this article to estimate 
congestion costs. Based on  Prud’homme and Sun (2000), we applied a speed-density model 
which, combined with an extensive database, enabled us to differentiate congestion costs as 
regards speed-classes of 5 km/h. Section 3 describes the PRR and the context characterizing 
up-to-date traffic conditions in the greater Paris area. We equally report the data and the 
parameters involved. In section 4, we estimated congestion costs for the PRR and analysed 
their 2000-2007 evolution. This section will equally contain sensitivity tests since we 
“disaggregated” our approach as regards temporal and geographical scales. Section 5 
summarized results and attempted to extrapolate them on both national and regional levels. 
Finally, the discussion regarding PRR road-pricing is presented in section 6. Although the 
principal forces of our model do not rely on that specific issue, it however permits one to 
illustrate some lessons stressed by other studies on that topic. 
 
2. Congestion Modeling 
 
Congestion modeling has inspired both engineers and economists for decades (Lighthill and 
Whitham 1955, Walters 1961, Vickrey 1969). Time wasting occurs when an infrastructure 
cannot effectively deal with a certain level of traffic. Whereas engineers have been more 
interested in the supply side, i.e. the physical constrain capacity, economists have in contrast 
been more likely to concentrate on travel demand. In order to estimate social waste which 
occurs in the PRR, the traditional Pigouvian framework is used below. This focuses on the 
social wastes resulting from the divergence between effective and optimal equilibriums. 
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Because motorists do not internalize the entire consequences of their actions, they impose 
time losses on others: private and social costs on the market of displacements differ. In order 
to illustrate this, let us consider Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 – Equilibriums on the Market of Displacements 
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The market equilibrium is reached at the intersection of the demand curve (D(q)4) with the 
private cost curve (I(q)5), i.e. point a. It is however sub-optimal because of road congestion. 
The traffic that would maximize the collective welfare indeed lies at the intersection of D(q) 
with the social cost (S(q)6), i.e. point b. As a consequence, there is an “excess” of xy motorists 
on the road. After the y point, each additional vehicle generates a social cost greater than its 
social benefit. We can thus define road congestion as the cost supported by society when the 
use of the transportation infrastructure is x instead of y. The corresponding “dead weight loss” 
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 The demand is expressed as an inverse function of the road use cost. We used a linear demand 
function whose slope can be deduced from the price elasticity of the road use (ε): D(q) = b + a*q with 
b = fixed cost if the road is empty and a = p/(ε*q) in a point (q,p) 
5
 The private cost is composed of a fixed cost (I0 ; mainly fuel, insurance and deterioration of the 
vehicle) and of a time opportunity cost (w ; main component of the so-called “generalized cost”). I(q) 
varies inversely with the traffic speed (s(q)) because of travel duration: I(q) = I0 + w/s(q). 
6
 The social cost function is obtained by adding the private cost and its derivative multiplied by the 
quantity of road use: S(q) = I(q) + I’(q)*q. 
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can be estimated by evaluating the variation of economic welfare associated to each situation 
(=prbe-lra=plge-gba, Quinet and Vickerman 2004). According to this vision, the market of 
displacements is characterized by sub-optimality as soon as the demand of road use is 
positive. Note equally that the road space is considered here as a public commodity whose 
quality of service, i.e.  the time necessary to travel, depends on traffic conditions. It can be 
synthesized by the speed-density relationship (s(q)7) which reflects either the infrastructure’s 
physical capacity or drivers’ habits. It is possible to interpret this relation as the distance 
separating two vehicles for a given speed. The speed-density function, or the speed-flow8 
depending on the output chosen9, provides the basis of the “fundamental diagram” (Walters 
1961, Evans 1992). By linking the level of road use to private and social costs, this 
technological relationship allows us to shape functions and subsequently, to measure 
externalities.  
 
Relying on the partial equilibrium framework, this type of approach belongs to the so-called 
“static” family of congestion modelling (Verhoef 1999). As noted by the advocates of 
“endogenous congestion” (Vickrey 1969, Arnott and alii. 1990, Lindsey and Verhoef 2000, 
Leurent 2005), the “static” methodologies fail in integrating to the decisional process of 
drivers the “scheduling costs” related to predicable bottlenecks, i.e. late or early arrivals10. 
Despite this limitation, we are nevertheless convinced of our methodology’s interests. In fact, 
considering behavioural adjustments seems necessary in order to correctly assess the impact 
of changing travel conditions on the modal choice of commuters or on the re-localisation of 
households within the intra-urban equilibrium framework11. The aim of this article is more 
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 We retain here a linear specification: s(q) = s0 + d*q with s0 = speed if the road is empty (q=0). 
8
 The flow (veh/h) is the product of the speed (km/h) with the density (veh/km). 
9
 The choice of the relevant output to study road congestion has led to a strong debate among 
transportation researchers. In this article, although Figure 1 retains the density for sakes of 
comprehension, calculations rely on vehicle*kilometer (vkm) measurements. This unit of counting is 
though to take better into account the social utility of travel activity because merging the number of 
vehicles and the length of each displacement.    
10
 Drivers who are daily confronted with bottlenecks when entering an infrastructure change their 
displacement’s habits by adapting their departure/arrival hours. From a theoretical point of view, total 
“scheduling costs” are said to be equal to the total travel time costs (Arnott and alii. 1993). Empirical 
investigations have proved that they are non negligible for drivers (Small 82, De Palma and Fontan 
2001). 
11
 “Dynamic” models are equally useful to understand the observed growing duration of peak-periods, 
to introduce individual heterogeneity in the analysis (Arnott and alii. 1993), to assess the impact of 
traffic information on drivers’ habits (Arnott and alii. 1999) or to fully appraise the effect of road-
pricing on the level of traffic. In opposition to the static situation, it in fact better catches the inducted 
road usage resulting from improved traffic conditions. 
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humble. It just seeks to propose a reasonable order of magnitude for social losses due to road 
congestion. The methodology presented above seems thus sufficient for that purpose. Second, 
the “picture” of the PRR traffic conditions we will give in section 4 may be more relevant 
than others inside the “static” congestion family, for conceptual and practical reasons.  
 
Some authors prefer in fact to define road congestion as the difference between the effective 
number of hours spent on the infrastructure and the one which would prevail in cases of an 
“empty road”12 (Bouladon 1991, Quinet 1994, European Commission 1995). However, one 
easily understands why such a definition is inappropriate. It completely denies the social 
utility of the transportation infrastructure13 and ignores the demand side of the reasoning. In 
fact, it does not take for referential the optimal equilibrium. A variant of this theoretical mis-
specification is furnished by studies which estimate road congestion by comparing effective 
travel times and what travel times would be under “free-regime” 14 (INFRAS 2000, Schrank 
and Lomax 2005, COMPETE 2006). One other rival definition of road congestion could be 
qualified as “fiscal”. It stipulates that congestion losses may be approximated by the amount 
of taxes that would lead to the optimal situation (Newberry 1990). From Figure 1, one can 
easily deduce the optimal tax that would force motorists to fully internalize impacts of their 
private decisions (=be). For the “fiscal” vision to be true, areas pemb and bca should be equal. 
As we will see in section 5, there are no reasons for this equality to be satisfied15.  Above all, 
our approach seems particularly accurate since it takes into account one major criticism 
traditionally addressed to “static” models, namely the uniqueness of the equilibrium on the 
market of displacements.  
 
Speed-density or speed-flow methodologies indeed consider behaviours of motorists as 
exogenous and tend to recognize a sole demand curve (Verhoef 1999). Outputs and traffic 
speed are therefore supposed to remain constant and the equilibrium reached is unique. Such 
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 This configuration is derived from the speed-density relationship. It corresponds to the traffic speed 
when the density is zero. 
13
 As well as its funding. 
14
 Road use on a given infrastructure can be characterized by three types of traffic regime (Hall and 
alii. 1992). “Free-regime” corresponds to the situation where drivers are not numerous on the road 
and the traffic speed is therefore high. In situation of “transition regime”, the infrastructure receives its 
maximal charge, a queue is formed and the flow is equal to the road capacity. Finally, during 
“crowded regime”, the flow and the speed progressively decline untill the moment where all vehicles 
are stopped.  
15
 “Even if such definition relies on the good referential (the sub-optimality), it mistakes the end (to 
reduce the congestion) with the mean (the tax)” (Prud’homme and Sun 2000). 
7 
 
specification seems inappropriate. According to the speed-flow relationship, to a given traffic 
speed in fact correspond two different levels of road use: one over “free-regime” and one over 
“crowded-regime”. It therefore follows that the intersection of the demand curve with the 
private cost curve coincides with a double equilibrium. Because of non stationary forces, the 
one corresponding to “hypercongestion”, i.e. over “crowded regime”, is generally forgotten in 
“static” models (Verhoef 1999, Button 2004).  
 
Conversely, we are able to use here an extensive database which allows us to distinguish the 
PRR’s use as regards speed-classes of 5 km/h. We can thus differentiate the demand curve 
thanks to an accepted elasticity16. Given that effective and optimal quantities depend on the 
demand curve’s level, we will distinguish several social costs. Consequently, we will better 
highlight the fact that the marginal vehicle is more costly for society when it accesses an 
infrastructure which is already crowded. Even if this differentiation process is not “micro-
founded”, it nevertheless constitutes a notable methodological improvement. Finally, because 
our database can be exploited according to temporal or geographical dimensions, we will shed 
light on when and where road congestion mainly occurs on the PRR. We will equally adjust 
with parameters involved and geographically differentiate the speed-density relationship in 
order to provide sensitivity tests. 
 
3. PRR’s Presentation and Data  
 
The Paris Ring-Road (PRR) - Built on “old fortifications” and finished in 1973, the PRR is an 
urban highway 35 kms in length surrounding the municipality of Paris. Like many 
industrialized countries, France faced, during the seventies, the co-development of the 
automobile system and sub-urbanization (Brueckner 2000). The aim of the PRR was to 
relieve Parisian streets from the excess of vehicles and to help the spatial re-organization of 
people and activities that the State just decided to enhance with the creation of “new towns” 
(Sheamur and Alvergne 2003). However, the PRR became a victim of its own success and its 
circulation routes were rapidly crowded (Gérondeau 1977). The demographic and economic 
hegemony of the Parisian territory, as well as the radiocentric organization of the national 
road system, are some rationales to justify the fact that, in 2000, the region concentrated 89 % 
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 By observing the effective equilibrium, point a on Figure 1, we first deduce the slope (a= p/(ε*q)) 
and then b.  
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of national queues (URF 2007). Although the increase of motorized displacements mainly 
occurred in the “Grande Couronne”, i.e. the “second belt” of the agglomeration, over last 
decades (EGT 2002), central Paris and the PRR were responsible for 33 % of these wastes of 
time in 2000 (29 % of national queues). In line with these figures, the infrastructure is often 
taken as a symbol of congestion distress within the French collective imagination17.  
 
Since 1995, concrete action has been engaged in order to reduce this problematic “car 
dependency” (Newman and Kenworthy 1989, Dupuy 2006). At the regional level, financial 
efforts were mainly oriented to the modernization of public transit and a better configuration 
of radial networks. At the municipal level, the mayor of Paris decided in 2001 to couple a 
“regulation by quantities” (Prud’homme and Kopp 2008), i.e. narrowing of the road space 
available for private cars by about 25 %, with a stimulation of alternative transportation 
modes18. Available data clearly highlight effects of these policies. After a long stagnation, the 
railway public has vigorously been re-born at both regional and municipal levels (RATP 
2007). The use of private cars in central Paris has simultaneously decreased by 20 % between 
2000 and 2007 (Bilan des Déplacements 2007), as well as the level of pollutant emissions (- 
32 %19, Airparif 2006). However, in accordance with the desired political orientation, time 
losses have risen because of the induced speed fall by about 11 % (Prud’homme and Kopp 
2008). Due to its links with the central city, as well as the importance relying on 
transportations issues in the current debate on the “Grand Paris ” (Crozet 2007, Gillli and 
Offner 2009), i.e. the reform of the territorial governance of the Parisian agglomeration, it 
seems to us of interest to examine what has happened on the PRR during this period.  
 
Traffic Data - The empirical support has been provided by the Division de la Voierie et des 
Déplacements, Section Tunnels, Berges et Périphérique de la Ville de Paris. Data were 
obtained from receptors incorporated into the road structure and refer to what has happened 
during the last 6 minutes (240 periods per day) on each 500 meters-long section of the PRR 
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 The PRR is equally said to constitute a physical barrier between central Paris and its suburbs. It 
symbolises the lack of territorial cohesion among the Parisian agglomeration (Pinçon-Charlot 2008). 
In order to solve this problem, it has been planned to progressively cover the PRR. Works have even 
begun on some sections of the infrastructure. 
18
 Several developments have been engaged. Buses now benefit from dedicated lanes, a system of rent-
bicycles and a new line of street-car have been inaugurated. The parking pricing-scheme has equally 
evolved in favour of residents. 
19
 This last evolution cannot be completely attributed to the municipal policy. In fact, it has mainly 
been engendered by technological progress and norms related car engines (- 26 %, Airparif 2006). 
9 
 
(71 sections). The unit of counting is called “section-period” (s-p). It has been decided to 
restrict observations to Tuesdays and Thursdays of June and October20. Although it offers us a 
rich empirical support, this database has required an intense work of cleaning. It was in fact 
composed of many broken-series that would have made impossible for any serious 
comparison. Some geographical sections had no observation at all, others were incomplete21. 
For our estimates to be reliable, we need a complete distribution of the observations, that is to 
say, the exact full number of s-p for the two years and for each section/day. As a 
consequence, we have divided the original database into the smallest ones, each of them 
according to temporal and geographical dimensions22. This process has enabled us to sort and 
to consider the sole comparable observations. We had then to accurately compare the number 
of journeys that would constitute our sample and the number of observation posts in each 
geographical area23. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the PRR traffic24 as well as the 
speed-density relationship calculated for the entire infrastructure25. 
 
Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics and PRR’s Speed-Density Relationship 
Traffic conditions 
2000 2007 
Daily Traffic 
(M vkms) 
Av. speed 
(km/h) 
Av. density 
(veh/km) 
Daily Traffic 
(M vkms) 
Av. speed 
(km/h) 
Av. density 
(veh/km) 
7,830 45.9 175 7,661 43.5 185 
Speed-density relationship 
s(q) = 90.285 – 0.253*q 
                                                                 (0.007)    (0.000)                                     R2 = 0.75 
Source: Author’s calculations after the work of cleaning realised on the database of the Division de la Voierie et 
des Déplacements, Section Tunnels, Berges et Périphérique de la Ville de Paris. 
 
PRR traffic conditions have undergone an evolution similar, in trend, as those of central Paris. 
If the number of vkms driven daily has fallen between 2000 and 2007 (- 2.2 %), it has not 
been accompanied by any improvement in the service’s quality: the average speed has 
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 These dates have been chosen because they are qualified as representative by municipal agents. 
21
 The same can be said about the temporal dimension. 
22
 Five periods (00-07h, 07-10h, 10-17h, 17-20h, 20-00h) and four areas (North, East, West, South) 
were retained.  
23
 We have finally retained 6 days per year (3 in June, 3 in October) and 49 sections (on 71 possible). 
Observations are then extrapolated to the whole PRR and to 300 days a year. 
24
 Both circulation senses have been merged. 
25
 We obtain it by leading a simple regression, corrected of heteroskedasticity, on data obtained from 
our sample and corresponding to a single day of observation. 
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decreased (- 5.2 %). Although the magnitude differs26, this tendency is comparable to the one 
given by official data. Note furthermore that the average speed is about a half of that which 
would correspond to the “empty road”. Above all, figures in Table 1 have led us to believe 
that the PRR has shifted between 2000 and 2007 from the “transition regime” to the 
“crowded” one. It is in fact possible to rewrite the speed-density relationship as a flow-speed 
function, f(s) = 356.86*s – 3.95*s2. The flow then reaches its maximum when the derivative 
of this equation is null, that is to say, when s equals 45.2 km/h. The speed evolution passes 
through this point and, consequently, traffic conditions on the PRR seem to be characterized 
currently by “hypercongestion”27. Despite the vkms’ decrease, one may legitimately expect 
congestion losses due to PRR’s over-use to have increased between observation dates.  
 
It should equally be pointed out that the traffic decrease on the PRR is minor compared to the 
one registered for inner Paris, whatever the source retained. Because the traffic in and around 
the city are necessarily linked, two rationales can be advanced to justify this. First and most 
obvious, although there exist other transportation modes to cross the metropolitan territory, 
the PRR always constitutes a major node of the regional road system. Its frequency seems 
therefore less elastic because of the sub-urbanization process still experienced by the Parisian 
agglomeration (Gilli 2009, Gilli and Offner 2009). By considering an average trip on the PRR 
of 8 kms, it can thus be calculated that more than 950,000 vehicles travel via the infrastructure 
every day. One can also deduce28 from EGT (2002) that the PRR accounts for 6.4 % of vkms 
daily which take place in the region using a private car, ratio that has to be compared to the 
sole 70 kms of road within it. Second, the infrastructure might currently receive some former 
Parisian motorists. As suggested in Prud’homme and alii. (2009), displacement costs in 
central Paris may have become so expensive in some city areas that motorists would now 
receive incentives to use the PRR instead of the capital’s streets. The average traffic speed on 
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 According to Indicateurs Généraux (2007), the traffic has declined by 7 % (2,283 M vkms in 2000 
and 2,120 M vkms in 2007), the average speed by 10 % (51.2 km/h in 2000 and 46 km/h in 2007). 
Such divergence, relatively important, may originate from the panel’s nature and from the necessary 
work of cleaning preformed on the database. Our sample might therefore under-estimate the traffic 
evolution, a possibility that should be taken into consideration during the presentation of estimate 
results. We were unfortunately unable to learn how the broken-series were treated during the 
extraction of data providing the Indicateurs Généraux. 
27
 According to traffic speeds given by Indicateurs Généraux (2007), the PRR in 2007 was over 
“saturation regime” and cloth to tip over “crowded” one.  
28
 From EGT (2002) we know that 44 % of the 35 M displacements carried-out daily in the region 
were motorised. We obtained the number of vkms by multiplying it with the average travel range (6.4 
km), transformed into distance based on a 0.25 coefficient. This produces about 123.2 M vkms.  
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the PRR is in fact 2.5 times higher than the actual one in central Paris. This possible “road 
transfer” might consequently soften the decline that would have normally prevailed and, 
inversely, trigger the congestion cost on the PRR.  
 
Parameters – Estimates rely on two types of information: some tutelary values (especially the 
time opportunity cost) and the demand elasticity of road use. According to the Boiteux report 
(2001, actualized in 2004 and 2005), i.e. the official report used in France for transportation 
studies, the mean value of a displacement (w) performed with a private car across the Parisian 
agglomeration was equal to 9.3 €/h in 2000. By assuming a consumption growth rate of 2 %, 
one obtains a time opportunity cost of 10.2 €/h in 200729. The use of mean parameters ignores 
however displacements motives. To overcome this limitation, we will consider a second value 
of the time. For travels driven during peak-periods, we will retain the one related to Home-
Work displacements, namely 12.2 €/h. Following the same method to up-date this value, it 
becomes 13.4 €/h for 2007. These values are for only one passenger. We will therefore 
consider the occupation rate of vehicles, i.e. 1.3 (Orfeuil 2008). Moreover, it is known that 23 
% of the PRR’s traffic concerned goods delivery in 2000 (Bilan des Déplacements 2001). 
Official reports advise in this case to retain a value of the time equal to 31.4 €/h. It should not 
be indexed annually30. This differentiation of displacement motives will lead us to find a 
coefficient which will be applied to congestion costs expressed in terms of vkm31. Concerning 
the second component of the generalized cost, the fixed cost (I0), this is said to be equal to 
0.30 €/vkm in 2006 (Orfeuil 2008). Because the price index of motorized displacements 
experienced a 14.5 % increase between 2000 and 2006 (Insee 2007), we considered an initial 
value of 0.26 €/vkm. The last parameter we are interested in is the demand elasticity of the 
road use (ε), i.e. the commuter’s sensitivity to displacement costs. We retained a usual 
elasticity of - 0.8 (Goodwin 1992, Litman 2006). In order to provide sensitivity tests, we will 
equally consider an alternative demand elasticity equal to - 0.4 for trips carried-out during 
peak-periods. This can be justified by the potential “constrained” nature of trips at these 
periods of the day. All parameters are remembered in Appendix. 
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 “This value of the time evolves from one year to the other with respect to the unit consumption’s 
expenditures of the households, (…), with an elasticity of -0.7” (Instruction Cadre 2004). 
30
 It « comes back to consider that productivity gains will compensate the charges’ increase resulting 
from a better respect of social and road legislations »  (Instruction Cadre 2004). 
31
 Considering the general case, we find 1.367 (= (23*31.4+77*1.3*9.3)/(100*1.3*9.3)) for  2000 and  
1.315 (= (23*31.4+77*1.3*10.2)/(100*1.3*10.2)) for 2007. 
12 
 
4. Congestion Costs on the PRR 
 
General approach - The first calculations’ stage consists in finding gaps between effective 
and optimal quantities of road use, i.e. between x and y on Figure 1. For this purpose, we 
equalize social cost functions and demand functions which have been ad hoc obtained due to 
the travel elasticity32.  
 
Table 2 – Gaps between Effective and Optimal Situations on the PRR 
 Effective Situation  Optimal Situation 
Speed 
(km/h) 
Density 
(veh/km) 
Flow 
(veh/h) 
Speed 
(km/h) 
Density 
(veh/km) 
Flow 
(veh/h) 
2.5 347 867 13.9 302 4,191 
7.5 327 2,454 23.0 266 6,115 
12.5 307 3,843 28.8 243 7,000 
17.5 288 5,035 33.4 225 7,506 
22.5 268 6,028 37.4 209 7,818 
27.5 248 6,824 41.0 195 7,985 
32.5 228 7,423 39.9 199 7,948 
37.5 209 7,824 47.5 169 8,032 
42.5 189 8,027 50.8 156 7,927 
47.5 169 8,033 54.4 142 7,719 
52.5 149 7,841 57.6 129 7,437 
57.5 130 7,451 61.4 114 7,005 
62.5 110 6,864 65.2 99 6,459 
67.5 90 6,079 69.3 83 5,751 
72.5 70 5,096 73.6 66 4,857 
85.8 18 1,521 85.8 18 1,521 
Source : Author’s calculations. 
 
As predicted by the methodology, the PRR is almost constantly used in a sub-optimal way. 
This over-use is however not homogenous. It reaches its maximum (30 %) between 15 and 35 
km/h and it progressively declines for superior speed-classes. As a consequence, social costs 
imposed by vkms in these speed-classes will tend to be negligible. Even if it corresponds to 
the highest social utility of the infrastructure, the traffic speed which allows the maximum 
flow on the PRR (45,2 km/h) is also associated with welfare losses. We now have the entire 
information necessary to calculate congestion costs. Unit costs are obtained by estimating the 
variation of economic surplus corresponding to each speed-class (=prbe-lra=plge-gba). Then, 
                                                           
32
 See note 16. 
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we apply unit costs to the correspondent number of vkms. An example based on the 5-10 
km/h speed-class is given in Appendix. 
 
Table 3 – PRR’s Congestion Costs 
 2000 2007 
Speed 
(km/h) 
Distrib 
(%)  
Traffic  
(M vkms) 
Unit costs 
(€/vkm) 
Congestion 
 (M €) 
Distrib 
 (%) 
Traffic  
(M vkms) 
Unit costs 
(€/vkm) 
Congestion 
 (M €) 
2,5 0.15 3.59 2.613 12.86 0.19 4.30 2.866 16.16 
7,5 1.20 28.13 0.646 24.86 1.34 30.71 0.709 28.51 
12,5 2.81 65.70 0.305 27.38 2.94 67.45 0.334 29.52 
17,5 3.72 87.12 0.173 20.64 3.83 88.07 0.190 21.92 
22,5 3.66 85.74 0.108 12.66 3.83 88.03 0.118 13.65 
27,5 3.59 84.11 0.070 8.04 3.63 83.44 0.077 8.37 
32,5 3.38 79.23 0.031 3.36 3.27 75.08 0.034 3.34 
37,5 2.88 67.52 0.031 2.83 2.69 61.77 0.034 2.72 
42,5 2.53 59.59 0.020 1.67 1.98 45.55 0.022 1.33 
47,5 2.14 50.36 0.014 0.94 1.82 41.86 0.015 0.82 
52,5 2.02 47.76 0.009 0.56 2.19 50.26 0.010 0.61 
57,5 2.71 63.85 0.005 0.48 3.74 85.87 0.006 0.68 
62,5 3.83 90.30 0.003 0.40 7.88 181.08 0.004 0.84 
67,5 5.82 136.98 0.001 0.34 15.58 358.09 0.002 0.93 
72,5 8.19 192.53 0.000 0.25 20.16 463.21 0.001 0.64 
85,8 51.38 1,206.50 0.000 0.00 24.94 573.37 0.000 0.00 
Total 100 2,349  117.2a 100 2,298  130.1a 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Note: a: adjusted with the coefficient taking into consideration the differentiation of displacements’ motives. 
 
According to the figures in Table 3, the PRR was more expensive in 2007 for the Parisian 
public as a transportation infrastructure, either in absolute or relative terms. Time losses due 
to its over-use had reached 130.1 M€, an amount corresponding to a 13 M€ (+ 11 %) increase 
compared to 2000 (117.2 M€)33. In fact, more hours were “consumed” in 2007 on the PRR 
(53 Mhs) as regards 2000 (51 Mhs). Of course, the congestion cost’s annual growth rate could 
be considered as weak (+ 1.5 %), and even greater once corrected of which could be 
sometimes termed its “artificial” component (+ 0.8 %), i.e. the time opportunity cost’s up-
date34. However, introducing remarks on road congestion lead us to negatively assess these 
                                                           
33
 We have performed calculations by using statistics supplied by Indicateurs Généraux (2007). We 
find congestion costs equal to 116 M€ in 2000 and to 122 M€ in 2007. The possible bias resulting 
from the sample’s construction seems therefore not to have a major influence on estimates’ results 
even if it should be moderated. In fact, to perform “true” calculations we should have corrected the 
vkms’ distribution, but we were unable to do it.  
34
 To up-date the time opportunity cost, we have considered an annual growth rate of consumption’s 
expenditures equal to 2 %. We made this choice because of ignorance concerning the “real” growth 
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results. Even to smaller extent, notably compared to what has been observed for traffic 
conditions within Paris (Prud’homme and Kopp 2008), this increased cost of moving people 
could restrict the territorial development of the agglomeration. In order to illustrate this, 
consider that the shift towards “crowded-regime” on the PRR dominates the traffic decrease. 
Equal to 0.050 €/vkm in 2000, the mean congestion cost thus rises to 0.057 €/vkm in 2007 (+ 
14 %). Within our model, this deterioration implies a change of the vkms’ distribution. Two 
main evolutions concerning this should be underlined.  
 
We first observed an important fall in the median speed: it passes from 85 km/h in 2000 to 
67.5 km/h in 2007. Following studies on that topic (Corbett and Simon 1999, ONISR 2006), 
we can explain this by the progressive introduction, since 2004, of 8 speed-cameras on the 
PRR. More than 334,600 motorists have thus been fined for speeding in 2007 (Bilan des 
Déplacements 2007). While this road policy has an impact on the mean traffic speed (by 
modifying drivers’ habits)35, it does not have any significant implication in terms of 
congestion costs since superior speed-classes are associated with low unit costs36. Conversely, 
worst effects of speed decline are reflected in the distribution beginning. The relative share of 
vkms driven below 20 km/h has grown from 7.9 % to 8.3 %. This evolution, despite its 
weakness, has even been coupled with an absolute increase of the number of vkms driven at 
such speeds37. This change mechanically increases the extent of the social waste. The 
congestion cost resulting from these “slow” vkms has thus experienced a 12 % increase over 
the period (85.7 M€ in 2000 and 96.1 M€ in 2007). In order to better highlight this, we now 
consider the PRR under the temporal and geographical dimensions. 
 
Temporal and Geographical “Disaggregations” - During the database’s construction, we 
have considered two peak-periods (07-10h and 17-20h), others referring to off-periods (00-
                                                                                                                                                                                     
rate, which could be considered as generous. By mobilizing the “economic base theory”, Davezies 
(2008) in fact shows that Ile-de-France’s per head income tended to grow slowly over last decade, 
despite major economic performances.  
35
 One other explanation could be drawn from the increased share of displacements realized in the 
Parisian area with the use of two-wheels (Kopp 2009). This transportation mode in fact necessitates 
more vigilance from motorists because of accidents’ risks. 
36
 The distribution’s settling induces thus a small increase of 2 M€ for speed-classes which was 
between 50 and 75 km/h and an “economy” of 0.3 M€ for the greater one. 
37
 It passes from approximately 184.5 M vkms in 2000 to 190.5 M vkms in 2007 (+ 3.2 %). 
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07h, 10-17h and 20-00h)38. Remember that alternative demand elasticity and time values are 
applied for estimates performed over peak-periods. We have equally decided to calculate 
several speed-density relationships39 (see Appendix) for the geographical areas which have 
been defined (North, East, South, West)40. This process allows one to disregard the implicit 
assumption of transportation infrastructure’s homogeneity. Some sub-sections of the PRR are 
in fact structurally smaller and experience more traffic difficulties41. Table 4 describes the 
results. 
 
Table 4 – Temporal and Geographical “Disaggregations” 
 2000 2007 
 Traffic    
(M vkms) 
Av. speed 
(km/h) 
“Slow”b 
(%) 
Congestion 
(M€) 
Traffic   
(M vkms) 
Av. speed 
(km/h) 
“Slow”b   
(%) 
Congestion 
(M€) 
Temporal “Disaggregation” 
Peaks 723     30.4 17.3 85.9    737       28.6 17.7 100.5    
Off-peaks  1,626  57.3 3.7 40.2     1,561     54.4 4.0 44.9        
Total 2,349 45.9 7.9 126.1a 2,298 43.5 8.3 145.4a 
Geographical “Disaggregation” 
North 695 53.8 4.6 22.8 685 49.7 5.5 26.9 
East 595 47.7 7.0 43.8 569 43.3 7.9 53.8 
South 548 37.9 12.3 42.6 527 33.9 14.7 51.2 
West 511 45.0 8.6 27.0 516 49.8 5.9 19.7 
Total 2,349 45.9 7.9 136.2a 2,298 43.5 8.3 151.6a 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Notes: a: adjusted with the coefficient taking into consideration the differentiation of displacements’ motives. b: share of 
vkms driven under 20 km/h. 
 
From the temporal point of view, figures in Table 4 confirm the predominance of peak-
periods concerning the PRR congestion costs. While they received 32 % of the total number 
of vkms in 2007, these periods concentrated 69 % of time losses. One can furthermore remark 
that the worsening of traffic conditions recorded at the global level has happened during peak-
periods. The average speed has thus decreased by 4.8 %, leading to a congestion over-bill of 
17 % between 2000 and 200742. Even if it may come from the database specificities, it is also 
                                                           
38
 Sub-periods have been compiled to calculate vkms’ distribution. This “disaggregation” process is 
therefore for relative simplification and does not aim at examining details as how the PRR’s traffic has 
changed, minute after minute, which would necessitate a dynamic approach. 
39
 Congestion unit costs directly depend on the technological function’s slope. 
40
 North section goes from “Porte de Champerret” to “Porte Chaumont” (10 kms), East section from 
“Prés Saint Gervais” to “Porte Canal” (8 kms), South section from “Quai d’Ivry” to “Quai d’Issy” (10 
kms) and, finally, West section from “Pontaval” to “Porte des Ternes” (8 kms). 
41
 Since the road priority is given to vehicles entering the PRR, this differentiation might equally give 
insights about the dynamism of different zones. 
42
 Note that the extent of this growth is (artificially) amplified by the higher value of the time. 
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noticeable that this evolution is joined with a small increase (+ 1.9 %) of the total number of 
vkms driven on the PRR during the peak-periods, conversely to what is observed for off-
periods (- 3.9 %). This result may be in accordance with the “endogenous congestion” theory 
since the adjustments of commuters confronted to bottlenecks may explain the observed 
growing duration of peak-periods in many urban agglomerations (Boiteux report 2001, 
Berthier 1998). By spreading departure/arrival times on a wider range, transportation 
infrastructures are used in a more intensive manner and receive more vkms. This observation 
is equally compatible with the already mentionned assumption of “road report” from the 
Parisian streets towards the PRR.  
 
From the geographical point of view, we notice that time losses are more important on the 
eastern and southern sub-sections of the PRR43. Congestion costs have increased there by 22 
% and 20 % respectively. Whereas the extent of the market failure calculated for the eastern 
sub-section can be mainly explained by more significant unit costs44, the one corresponding to 
southern PRR describes intrinsic difficulties of this geographical zone (see Appendix). 
Difficulties that may be otherwise exacerbated. Because of the road space narrowing required 
to install a new street-car line on dedicated lanes, the traffic speed on the southern Maréchaux 
boulevards (parallel and 400 meters away from southern PRR) has strongly declined between 
2003 and 2007 (- 17 %). According to Prud’homme and alii. (2009), the “missing” vkms on 
Maréchaux boulevards45 appear to be potential candidates in order to explain why the 
southern PRR has embedded itself within “crowded regime”46. Even if one cannot fully 
consider this as the geographical side of the phenomenon commented previously47, the 
important (and growing) share of “slow” vkms driven on that part of the infrastructure (14.7 
                                                           
43
 These two sub-sections counts for 65 % of the total time waste generated on the PRR. 
44
 By considering the 5-10 km/h speed class, unit congestion costs for eastern, northern, southern and 
western areas were equal to 0.882 €/vkm, 0.717 €/vkm, 0.693 €/vkm and 0.713 €/vkm in 2007 
respectively. These figures are coherent since unit costs are inversely dependent on the speed-density 
relationship slope (see Appendix). 
45
 Traffic on Maréchaux boulevards has strongly declined (- 31 %) whereas the modal report towards 
the street-car has been proved to be very limited (2.6 %). 42.000 vkms are thus daily “missing”. See 
Prud’homme and alii. (2009) for more details. 
46
 According to geographical speed-flow relationships, the inflexion point for southern PRR is at 42.9 
km/h. The eastern PRR has shifted from “transition” to “crowded-regime” (inflexion point at 45.5 
km/h). 
47
 Each sub-section being an “opened-system” (conversely to the PRR considered on its all), the 
decrease of the number of vkms driven on the southern PRR (- 3.6 %) does not necessarily mean one 
least used of the infrastructure on that geographical area. In fact, the flow decrease associated to an 
increase of the density mechanically translates into a decline of the number of vkms driven on that 
sub-section.  
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% in 2007) forces us not to ignore this possible “road-transfer”. Inversely, the speed increase 
(+ 11 %) resulting from the decline of vehicles density on the western sub-section has 
engendered a small growth of the vkms driven on that part of the PRR (+ 1 %). In fact, the 
traffic regime can be characterized there of “transition” again48. It therefore follows an 
important fall of the share of “slow” vkms driven there and a major economy in terms of 
congestion cost (- 25 %). 
 
Finally, differentiating parameters offers alternative values to well-being losses49. The 
congestion cost obtained in the temporal case thus reaches 145.5 M€ in 2007, an amount 12 % 
higher than the one previously calculated. It can be deduced from these figures that 
congestion cost’s elasticities as regards demand sensitivity and time opportunity cost are 
respectively equal to 0.11 and 0.5750. Concerning the geographical “disaggregation”, it 
implies a total waste equal to 151.5 M€ (+ 14 %). Even if the elasticity of congestion cost as 
regards speed-density relationship slope does not appear robust, the physical capacity of roads 
seems to influence estimates in a similar manner as the time opportunity cost. 
  
5. The Magnitude of Road Congestion Costs 
 
According to results presented in this article, the PRR was in 2007 more congested and more 
expensive for society than seven years earlier. In spite of a reduced use (- 2.2 %), the 
worsening of traffic conditions has engendered a growth of the time spent on its “tarmac”. 
Above all, the observed speed fall (- 5.2 %) suggests that the PRR is currently used, on 
average, over “crowded regime” (or is cloth to tip on it). These results have to be confirmed 
by further studies. But if this trend continues, one could expect difficulties related to PRR’s 
congestion to worsen, negative conclusion from regional perspectives. In fact, the speed fall 
concomitant to road congestion on the PRR may affect the over-productivity of Ile-de-France 
by reducing the “effective size of labor market”, i.e. the number of jobs that can be matched 
                                                           
48
 Western PRR has shifted from crowded regime to transition one (inflexion point at 46.2 km/h). The 
northern PRR has stayed over free-regime (46.5 km/h). 
49
 The temporal scenario combines two opposing forces. Whereas one weakest elasticity reduces gaps 
between effective and optimal quantities of road use (and consequently the social waste induced by 
infrastructure’s over-use), the higher tutelary value corresponding to Home-Work displacements raises 
the bidding of time losses. 
50
 One could expect the time opportunity cost’s elasticity to be higher. This “low” value is explained 
by the (recommended) non-indexation of the time opportunity cost for displacements related to goods 
delivery. 
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under x minutes of displacement (Prud’homme and Lee 1999, Cervero 2001)51. In the same 
logic, because the cost of moving people across the Parisian territory is progressively 
increasing, “push-forces” could become significant enough to make the agglomeration really 
explode in excessively de-concentrated “sub-centers”. Despite their normative scope, the 
importance of Ile-de-France’s economy within the national system of social redistribution 
forces us not to neglect these types of arguments (Davezies 2008)52. From a more positive 
point of view, this would certainly imply future troubles linked to the motorized mobility.  
 
Concerning the extent of the social waste, our results range between 130 M€ and 150 M€. Of 
course, these amounts are closely linked to functional forms related to shape demand, costs 
and speed-density functions. However, the manner in which we have conceptually defined 
road congestion or differentiated demand curves are some rationales to convince readers that 
our methodology can be considered as relevant. Calculations using the “empty road” approach 
thus result in a social waste equal to 370 M€53 for 2007. If one retains aggregated congestion 
costs, as those proposed by INFRAS (2000), time losses due to the PRR’s over-use would 
reach 1,050 M€54. The gap between methodologies is therefore enormous. Without giving 
them a universal scope, we can nevertheless mobilize our figures to propose an order of 
magnitude to road congestion costs. For that, we need further information, as well as some 
assumptions. According to URF (2007), central Paris and the PRR were, in 2006, responsible 
for 26 % of queues recorded at the national level (33 % at the regional level)55. We equally 
know that vkms driven on the PRR correspond to 33.5 % of those driven in Paris (Kopp 
2009). Unfortunately, we currently lack information on the respective importance of 
congestion costs in and around the French capital. Consequently, Table 5 presents two 
variants: the first considers that the road congestion is relatively as costly (per vkm) in both 
                                                           
51
 The « effective size of labor market» can be seen as a media by which externalities resulting from 
spatial concentration are spread across the urban territory. It depends on the traffic speed, the city size 
and density (Prud’homme and Lee 1999). 
52
 Davezies (2008) explains that productive advantages of Ile-de-France permits to redistribute 8% of 
the national GDP to others regions.  
53
 If the traffic speed were equal to 90.3 km/h, 25.4 Mh would have been necessary to realize 2,298 M 
vkms. It would then correspond to an “economy” of 27.4 Mh, i.e. 370 M€ once valorized at 10.2 €/h 
and corrected by the coefficient taking into consideration the displacements for delivery goods. 
54
 INFRAS (2000) proposes social costs (for highways) equal to 2.032 €/vkm in case of “congested 
road” or to 1.907 €/vkm in case of “dense road”. If one applies former ones to vkms effectively driven 
under 15 km/h and later ones to vkms driven between 15 and 45 km/h, a bill of 1,051 M€ is reached. 
55
 Because of the lack of information, we will consider these “queues” as road congestion, although the 
definition retained by the French Gendarmerie Nationale (quoted by URF 2007) differs from ours. 
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zones while the second stipulates that traffic difficulties in Paris are relatively 2 times 
superior. In a comparative perspective, we also present results associated to INFRAS (2000) 
external costs. 
 
Table 5 - Order of Magnitude for Congestion Costs 
 Aggregated case Geographical case INFRAS 
 P=PRR P=2*PRR P=PRR P=2*PRR P=PRR P=2*PRR 
Paris+PRR 518 906 603 1,056 4,188 7,326 
France 1,994 3,487 2,322 4,061 16,109 28,175 
Ile-de-France 1,571 2,748 1,829 3,200 12,692 22,199 
nat. GDPd 0.11 0.20 0.13 0.23 0.90 1.58 
reg. GDPe 0.30 0.53 0.35 0.62 2.46 4.30 
reg. Incomef 0.40 0.70 0.47 0.82 3.24 5.67 
Sources: Author’s calculations from INFRAS (2000), URF (2007) and Kopp (2009). 
Notes: d: 1,780,000 M€. e: 516,200 M€. f: 391,600 M€. 
 
Even if the numerous assumptions made force to the cautious, our data and our methodology 
suggest that social losses due to roads’ over-use equal, in France, around 0.2 % of the national 
GDP. On the one hand, this result does not enter in contradiction with the fact that road 
congestion is an expensive issue for French society. Because of the lack of coordination 
during individual displacements choices, a non negligible share of available societal time is 
daily sacrificed on transportation infrastructures, reality often exacerbated by psychological 
distress (Santos and Bharkarb 2006). On the other hand, figures presented above tend to 
moderate accusations against the unlimited cost of the motorized mobility, for what concerns 
time losses at least. As well as can be calculated that wastes due to sub-optimality on the PRR 
are equal to only 4 % of the total well-being it generates56, ratios in Table 5 are far away from 
the 2 % of national GDP sometimes advanced (European Commission 2001). This conclusion 
does not aim at defending any types of economical interests or territorial development’s 
patterns. On the contrary, by providing empirical information, we only seek to render the 
French debate on the motorized mobility more “secular”, as hoped by some academics 
convinced otherwise by the necessity of habits’ changes (Orfeuil 2008). To illustrate this, one 
may notice from same figures that challenges related to road congestion become more critical 
on the regional scale. Once applied to regional GDP or Income, social losses become three 
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 The total well-being generated by the PRR is composed by the number of hours driven (52.8 
Mh=544 M€), expenditures related to car use (689 M€) and the economic surplus of consumers, i.e. 
the difference between their willingness to pay and the effective cost of road use. One can evaluate 
this later at 2,000 M€, figure that amounts the total well-being at 3,233 M€. 
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times higher and constitute a major concern for Ile-de-France region. Therefore, the interest 
relies on correcting this market failure. Because an increase of capacities via physical 
investments does not constitute a successful solution within our theoretical framework57, let-
alone in reality (Duranton and Turner 2008), we end this article with a brief reflection about 
the “regulation by prices”.  
 
6. Marginal Pricing on the PRR58 
 
Even if road-pricing cannot yet be implemented on the PRR59, political willingness may soon 
be likely to modify rules of game (Conseil d’Analyse Stratégique 2008). In fact, time losses 
are not the sole external effect resulting from the use of private cars (Quinet 2004, Parry and 
alii. 2006, De Palma and Zaouali 2007) and the growing environmental constraints constitute 
a severe call for changes. According to Figure 1, the tax that would force motorists to 
internalize road congestion is equal to be, i.e. the marginal cost characterizing the optimal 
situation (=S(qopt)-I(qopt)). Based on that framework, Table 6 presents several schemes of 
marginal pricing. The two first columns consider congestion charges, the second focusing on 
the sole peak-periods. The two followings integrate, under an additive form, external costs 
related to noise, accidents, pollutants and greenhouse effect (Lindsey and De Palma 2006)60. 
Because CO2 emissions depend on the traffic speed, taxes presented in the last column are 
derived from a methodology which combines the speed-density relationship with an emission-
speed one (Prud’homme and alii. 2009, see Appendix). In that latter case, a ton of CO2 is 
valorized at 32 € (Conseil d’Analyse Stratégique 2008). 
 
Before commenting on results, let us remember that pricing schemes resulting from speed-
density methodologies are not the most relevant ones to fully estimate effects on the level of 
                                                           
57
 Analysis presented on Figure 1 corresponds to a given infrastructure. Any improvement of the road 
capacity results in a shift to the right of the I(q) and S(q) curves. It then corresponds to a decline of 
costs and leads to an increase of effective and optimal quantities. As a consequence, the sub-optimality 
is still present. 
58
 Analysis regarding road-pricing on the PRR would necessitate further study which cannot be 
substituted by this last section alone. It would be a pity not to tackle this point since it constitutes the 
logical progression of this present research.   
59
 According to the French law, road-pricing schemes are only allowed to cover funding necessary to 
new investments. For a review, see Raux and Souche (2004) or Conseil d’Analyse Stratégique (2008). 
60
 These external costs remain constant ones. Lindsey and De Palma (2006) retain them from Quinet 
(2004) and Unite (2001). 
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road use. Even if a decrease of 10.5 %61 can be calculated for the whole PRR (-12.6 % for 
sole peak-periods), vkms induced by better traffic conditions are in fact hardly discernible 
with the “static” framework (Verhoef 1999). Despite this limitation, figures in Table 6 offer 
interesting insights.  
 
Table 6 – Marginal Road-Pricing on the PRR 
 Congestion 
Taxes 
Peak-periods  
Taxes 
“Full” Taxes  
(1)g 
“Full” Taxes  
(2)h 
Taxes’ range (€/vkm) 4.05 – 0.00 5.31 – 0.00 4.15 – 0.11 4.15 – 0.10 
10-15 km/h (€/vkm) 0.77 0.99 0.87 0.87 
40-45 km/h (€/vkm) 0.16 0.20 0.27 0.26 
Toll Revenue (M€) 250.5 218.7 475.6 442.0 
Sources: Quinet (2004), Unite (2001), Prud’homme and alii. (2009), Conseil d’Analyse Stratégique (2008). 
Notes: g: external costs derived from Quinet (2004) and Unite (2001), see Appendix. h: CO2 unit costs from 
Prud’homme and alii. (2009), see Appendix. 
 
First, congestion taxes vary as regards traffic conditions. A trip of 8 kms on the PRR would 
thus imply a toll equal to 7.2 € if the traffic speed were of 12.5 km/h. This travel would cost 
2.2 € when driven at 42.5 km/h62. This result highlights a first complexity linked to marginal 
pricing strategies. The extreme volatility of pricing schemes would in fact necessitate 
expensive technologies and it may excessively disturb drivers making their displacements’ 
choices. Second, time losses represent the main component of tolls. External costs related to 
noise, accidents, pollutants and greenhouse effect, once added, exceed congestion tax only 
above 50 km/h. Differentiating CO2 emissions as regards traffic speed marginally alters this 
result63. One may then legitimately wonder about this fact which seems to be in contradiction 
with the primacy accorded to environmental problems. Consider thus that social losses due to 
CO2 emissions on the PRR represent only 14 % of the congestion waste64. Finally, it can be 
drawn from Table 6 that the “fiscal” definition of road congestion is not verified. In the 
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 From Table 3 we know gaps between effective and optimal level of road use, i.e. between x and y on 
Figure 1. We therefore correct the effective demand by this gap. 
62
 Due to methodological specificities, congestion marginal costs even become excessively expensive 
for worst traffic conditions (Verhoef 1999), as illustrated by the first speed-class. 
63
 According to our methodology, CO2 emissions on the PRR have only decreased by 8,000 tons 
between 2000 and 2007, i.e. an economy valorized at 0.3 M€ (see Appendix). Even if it is biased 
because of engines’ progresses (and the possible traffic over-evaluation), this result is ceteris paribus 
coherent with the observed speed fall. Inferior speed-classes are in fact associated with more emissions 
and, in 2007, compensate progresses realized otherwise. 
64
 Following this argument, one understands that transportation projects would more often satisfy 
economical appraisals thanks to time gains they induce rather than environmental benefits they 
generate. 
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simplest case, toll revenues appear twice as high (250 M€) compared to the extent of time 
losses. This result illustrates well one major difficulty linked to the implementation of road-
pricing, namely its social acceptability (Rothengatter 2003, Raux and Souche 2004). In fact, 
introducing a toll on the PRR would induce surplus’ transfers between the different types of 
commuters (Bureau and Glachant 2008). Such “regulation by prices” could worsen the 
(already) unequal accessibility to the regional labor market among social categories (Donzelot 
2004, Wenglenski 2007, Gobillon and Selod 2007) and, thus, restrain the public support to 
this type of intervention.  
 
Despite of what seems to be major limitations, solutions are nevertheless available to make 
road-pricing an effective regulation tool. Progresses related to NITCs and successful 
experiments of dynamic pricing offer first reasonable perspectives to facilitate drivers’ 
adjustments (De Palma and alii. 2005). In order to improve the social acceptability, a practical 
option would consist in implementing road-pricing progressively on the regional road network 
(Lindsey and De Palma 2006).  Introducing tolls on the PRR first, despite the symbol it would 
constitute, could in fact excessively disturb drivers’ habits and portfolios. Most of all, toll’s 
revenues should be used to finance quantitative and qualitative improvements of public 
transits in Ile-de-France (Small 1992, Crozet 2007). These fiscal transfers would of course 
exacerbate in the short run respective contributions of travellers to transportation activity by 
making the (already over-taxed) motorists pay for the (already subsidized) public audience 
(Orfeuil 2008). However, due to difficulties linked to infrastructures’ funding in Ile-de-France 
region, amounts presented in Table 6 could offer to drivers effective possibilities to shift 
towards cleaner transportation modes65. Improving the accessibiliy of public transits to the 
jobs centers would certainly constitue a major channel of policies sucesses. 
 
To conclude, note that alternative actions to road-pricing may equally be relevant in order to 
relieve road congestion. From our figures, it can in fact be calculated that increasing the 
vehicle occupation rate to 2 (instead of currently 1.3) would induce a fall of vkms driven on 
the PRR approximately equal to 33 %66. Even if this result suffers from above documented 
                                                           
65
 To illustrate this, consider that one year of “full” toll revenues would be sufficient to cover the 
creation of one street-car line as that mentioned by Prud’homme and alii. (2009). 
66
 Note first that 2,298 M vkms correspond to 2,531 passenger*kms (pkms). Suppose then that we 
keep constant the global mobility (in terms of pkms) as well as displacements due to goods’ delivery 
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limitations concerning “static” analysis, it constitutes an appreciable perspective. This “non-
market intervention” would thus save a congestion waste of 50 M€67. One therefore easily 
understands the interest relying in exploring options related to co-driving in particular (Small 
and alii. 2006), and to cooperative practices among commuters in general (Orfeuil 2008)68. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(529 vkms=529 pkms).  If one applies a vehicles’ occupation rate equal to 2, the 2,002 pkms 
previously traveled transform into 1,001 vkms. The total PRR use becomes 1,530 vkms. 
67
 If one applies a total traffic on the PRR of 1,530 vkms to general congestion unit costs, a social 
waste equal to 80 M€ is found. 
68
 Finally, debates on sustainable development too often focus on transportation issues whereas 
concrete solutions have equally to be found in the real estate’s domain. Focusing on the Parisian 
agglomeration, Korsu and Massot (2006) have calculated that building housings in order to bring 
closer people and jobs, especially in the central area, could save about 8 % of daily regional 
displacements. In addition, this strategy would soften land speculation, other major “push-forces” 
stressed by urban economics.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 7 - Estimates Parameters  
 2000 2007 
Fixed cost (€/vkm) 0.26 0.30 
Av. time value (€/h) 9.3 10.2 
House-Work time value (€/h) 12.2 13.4 
Delivery goods time value (€/h) 31.4 
Share of delivery goods (%) 23 
Road demand elasticity -0.8 / -0.4 
Sources: Ministère de l’Equipement, des Transports, de l’Aménagement du territoire, du Tourisme et de la Mer 
(2004), Orfeuil (2008), Insee (2007), Bilan des Déplacements (2001), Goodwin (1992), Litman (2006). 
 
 
Calculation of the PRR’s congestion cost in 2007 for the 5-10 km/h speed-class  
We know coordinates of points necessary to calculate (LGEP-AGB) area on Figure 1: 
 
X = 327 veh/km 
Y= 266 veh/km 
L = I(327) = 1.66 €/km 
M = S(266) = 2.04 €/km 
P = I(266) = 0.74 € /km 
 
We therefore obtain: 
 
Kilometric cost5-10 = LGEP – AGB = Y*(L - P) – (M - L)*(X – Y)/2 = 232.01 € /km 
 
It corresponds to the cost generated by 327 vehicles, driving one kilometer on the PRR at a 
traffic speed of 7.5 km/h instead of 23.0 km/h. We transform this in unit congestion cost 
(€/vkm) by diving it by the number of vehicles present on that kilometre, i.e. the density: 
 
Unit cost5-10 = 232.01/327 = 0.709 € /vkm 
 
It is then enough to multiply this unit cost by the total number of vkms driven into this speed-
class: 
Congestion cost5-10 = 0.709*30,713,000 = 28.51 M€ 
30 
 
 
This figure represents what has been lost by society in 2007 due to the fact that 30.7 M vkms 
have been realized on the PRR at a traffic speed reduced because of road congestion. We have 
finally to correct this social waste. In fact, one vehicle is occupied by 1.3 passengers (Orfeuil 
2008). Moreover, 23 % of PRR’s traffic results from goods’ delivery (Bilan des Déplacements 
2001) whose time value is more expensive (31.4 €/h instead of 10.2 €/h). A simple calculation 
(see note 42) conducts to find a 1.315 coefficient. The “true” social waste caused by road 
congestion on the PRR at the traffic speed of 7.5 km/h is: 
 
Congestion cost5-10 = 28.51*1.315 = 37.49 M€ 
 
 
Table 8 - Geographical Speed-Density Relationships 
Northern PRR s(q) = 93.119 – 0.249*q 
                                (0.152) (0.001)           R2=0.76 
Eastern PRR s(q) = 90.990 – 0.246*q 
                                (0.140)  (0.001)          R2=0.78 
Southern PRR  s(q) = 85.353 – 0.264*q 
                                (0.141)  (0.001)          R2=0.74 
Western PRR s(q) = 92.392 – 0.251*q 
                                (0.110)  (0.001)          R2=0.79 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
It may be observed that speed-density relationships do not fundamentally diverge across 
PRR’s sub-sections. The one related to the southern area offers the lowest maximum speed 
(s0=85.4 km/h), result coherent with the fact that it is composed on its main part by only two 
circulation lanes. Inversely, the road capacity appears superior for northern (s0=93.1 km/h) 
and western (s0=92.4 km/h) sub-sections.  
 
 
The PRR’s emission-density relationship 
The fuel consumption is a function of the velocity. The graph hereafter shows it clearly. It is 
infinite when speed is zero and decreases regularly when speed increases, up to 40-50 km/h. It 
stagnates then between 40-50 km/h and 90-100 km/h and increases again beyond this limit.   
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Figure 2 – Relationship between Speed and Fuel Consumption 
 
Source:www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/drive-Habits.shtml 
Note: the fuel’s consumption is measured in miles per gallon (i.e. in kilometer per liter) which explains 
the inversed form with respect to a graph expressed in liters per kilometer. 
 
One can deduce the function that connects fuel consumption and speed by considering the 
point where the curve cuts the y-axis69 and the point that corresponds to a speed of 30 
miles/hour70. Once this function derived, one multiplies it by the CO2 emissions associated 
with 1 litter fuel consumption (2.35 kg): 
 
For s < 50 km/h (expressed in kg/km):    CO2(s) = 0.624 – 0.00925*v 
For s > 50 km/h:   CO2(s) = 0.16 
 
This function is derived for private cars. Actually, the traffic on the PRR includes 
approximately 23 % commercial vehicles, which emit on average twice as much CO2 than 
cars. In that case, it will be advisable to multiply the obtained estimate by a coefficient of 1.13 
(=(0.23*2+0.67*1)). It is then possible to cross the emission-speed equation with the speed-
density relationship. One obtains the quantity of CO2 emitted as a function of the density of 
the road: 
CO2 = f(s) = λ+µ*v   (with λ = 0.624 and µ = -0.00925) 
s = g(q) = α+β*q (with α = 90.3 and β = -0.253) 
                                                           
69
 s = 5 miles/h = 8.04 km/h ; fuel consumption = 10 miles/gallon = 0.23 litter/km 
70
 s = 48.27 km/h ; fuel consumption = 30 miles/gallon = 0.078 litter/km 
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This gives us: 
 
For s < 50 km/h:    CO2 = h(q) = λ + µ*α +  µ* β *q = 0.00234*q – 0.2111  
For s > 50 km/h:   CO2 = 0.16 
 
We then can apply the number of vkms driven into each speed-class and sum it to obtain the 
whole quantity of CO2 yearly emitted on the PRR, without forgetting the coefficient 
considering commercial vehicles. Since a ton of CO2 can be valorized at 32 € (Conseil 
d’Analyse Stratégique 2008), we are able to find the environmental cost of one vkm as 
regards speed-classes.  
 
Table 9 – CO2 Emissions on the PRR 
Speed  
(km/h) 
Density 
(veh/km) 
CO2(q) 
(kg/vkm) 
Traffic2000 
(M vkms) 
Traffic2007 
(M vkms) 
CO2 2000 
(tons) 
CO2 2007 
(tons) 
CO2 unit 
cost (€/vkm) 
2.5 347 0.601 3.595 4.306 2,160 2,587 0.026 
7.5 327 0.555 28.127 30.713 15,598 17,031 0.025 
12.5 307 0.462 65.701 67.453 33,396 34,286 0.023 
17.5 288 0.416 87.120 88.070 40,254 40,692 0.022 
22.5 268 0.370 85.750 88.032 35,656 36,605 0.020 
27.5 248 0.277 84.109 83.450 31,084 30,840 0.018 
32.5 228 0.231 79.232 75.090 25,617 24,277 0.017 
37.5 209 0.185 67.523 61.772 18,709 17,115 0.016 
42.5 189 0.160 59.595 45.558 13,756 10,516 0.014 
47.5 169 0.160 50.380 41.867 9,299 7,728 0.013 
52.5 149 0.160 47.764 50.265 7,642 8,042 0.005 
57.5 130 0.160 63.861 85.871 10,218 13,739 0.005 
62.5 110 0.160 90.303 181.091 14,448 28,975 0.005 
67.5 90 0.160 136.983 358.100 21,917 57,296 0.005 
72.5 70 0.160 192.537 463.212 30,806 74,114 0.005 
85.8 18 0.160 1,206.50 573.374 193,040 91,740 0.005 
Total   2,349 2,298 569,068 560,010  
Sources: Author’s calculations from Prud’homme and alii. (2009), Conseil d’Analyse Stratégique  (2008). 
 
According to Table 9, 0.56 M tons of CO2 have been emitted because of PRR’s use in 2007. 
Once valorised at 32 € per ton, the PRR’s social cost due to greenhouse effect amounts at 18 
M€ (14% of the congestion waste). This guardian value of the CO2 is actually higher than 
alternatives ones. The Stern Report (2006) advises thus to retain a value of 25 €/ton and 
consider that one ton was exchanged at 10 € on BlueNex, the European spot market of C02, in 
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Februar 2009. With these values, the social cost of CO2 emissions on the PRR would 
respectively reach 14 M€ or 5.6 M€ (i.e. 11 % and 5 % of congestion externality). 
 
This methodology is also interesting for analytical purposes. In fact, it allows one to 
differentiate CO2 emissions as regards traffic speed71 and better highlight changes. CO2 
emissions on the PRR have thus weakly decreased (- 2 %) between dates. Because of the 
speed fall, a more important share of PRR’s traffic is nowadays realized into inferior speed-
classes, i.e. the more polluting ones. This can explains the weakness of the evolution72. Above 
all, this methodology offers more precisions concerning CO2 unit costs.  
 
 
Marginal taxes on the PRR 
We now present different pricing schemes for the “regulation by prices” on the PRR. We first 
consider the sole time losses, for the general case and during peak-periods (with a higher time 
value). We thereafter integrate (under an additive form) others external costs due to noise, 
accidents, greenhouse effect and pollutants (“full taxes”). These last ones, as in Lindsey and 
De Palma (2006), are drawn from Quinet (2004) and Unite (2001), except for last column of 
Table 11 whose CO2 unit costs are derived from the methodology presented above.  
 
Table 10 – External Costs linked to Noise, Accidents, Greenhouse Effect and Pollutants 
Externality Noise Accidents Pollution Greenhouse Total 
Value (€/vkm) 0.0056 0.0348 0.0422 0.0244 0.107 
Sources: Quinet (2004) and Unite (2001). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
71
 We do not have found any similar equation for the French case. But Renaut communicated to us 
that, in urban areas, passing from 10 km/h to 20 km/h induced an “economy” equal to 25 %. Our 
estimate results in a 17 % economy, amount not so far away.  
72
 This evolution is certainly under-evaluated. In fact, it supposes constant unit CO2 emission whereas 
technological progresses have made vehicles’ engines become cleaner (Airparif 2006). 
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Table 11 – Different Marginal Pricing Schemes for the PRR  
Speed         
(km/h) 
General Case 
(€/vkm) 
Peak-periods 
(€/vkm) 
“Full Taxes” (1)g 
(€/vkm) 
“Full Taxes” (2)h 
(€/vkm) 
2.5 4.046 5.315 4.153 4.155 
7.5 1.316 1.707 1.423 1.423 
12.5 0.767 0.993 0.874 0.872 
17.5 0.530 0.685 0.637 0.634 
22.5 0.392 0.506 0.499 0.495 
27.5 0.305 0.394 0.412 0.407 
32.5 0.327 0.422 0.435 0.427 
37.5 0.197 0.254 0.304 0.295 
42.5 0.159 0.204 0.266 0.256 
47.5 0.127 0.163 0.234 0.222 
52.5 0.103 0.132 0.210 0.191 
57.5 0.080 0.102 0.187 0.168 
62.5 0.062 0.079 0.169 0.150 
67.5 0.046 0.059 0.153 0.134 
72.5 0.033 0.041 0.140 0.121 
85.8 0.000 0.000 0.107 0.095 
Sources: Author’s calculations from Quinet (2004), Unite (2001) and Prud’homme and alii. (2009). 
Notes: g: external costs derived from Quinet (2004) and Unite (2001). h: CO2 unit costs based on Prud’homme 
and alii. (2009). 
